Taboos, Agriculture and Poverty. by Stifel, David et al.
This article was downloaded by: [K.U.Leuven - Tijdschriften]
On: 12 January 2012, At: 04:45
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,
UK
Journal of Development Studies
Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjds20
Taboos, Agriculture and Poverty
David Stifel 
a , Marcel Fafchamps 
b & Bart Minten 
c
a Department of Economics, Lafayette College, Easton,
PA, USA
b Department of Economics, Oxford University, Oxford,
UK
c IFPRI, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and LICOS – Center for
Institutions and Economic Performance, University of
Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Available online: 27 Oct 2011
To cite this article: David Stifel, Marcel Fafchamps & Bart Minten (2011): Taboos,
Agriculture and Poverty, Journal of Development Studies, 47:10, 1455-1481
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.561322
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any
representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to
date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be
independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable
for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damageswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection




































































 Taboos, Agriculture and Poverty
DAVID STIFEL,* MARCEL FAFCHAMPS** & BART MINTEN
{
*Department of Economics, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, USA, **Department of Economics, Oxford
University, Oxford, UK, {IFPRI, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and LICOS – Center for Institutions and
Economic Performance, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Final version received July 2010
ABSTRACT We study the impact of work taboos (fady days) on agriculture and poverty. Using
cross-sectional data from a national household survey for Madagascar, we ﬁnd that 18 per cent of
agricultural households have two or more fady days per week and that an extra fady day is
associated with 6 per cent lower per capita consumption and 5 per cent lower rice productivity. To
address the possible endogeneity of fady days, we present instrumental variable estimates and
heterogeneous eﬀect regressions using village ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd that smaller households and
those with less education employ less labour in villages with more fady days.
Wednesday is an evil day. If one starts working in the rice ﬁelds on a
Wednesday, there will be no harvest. On the other hand, Wednesday is a good
day for burials ... Thursday is dangerous. It might cause death in the village
and it is fady to have burials on this day ... Saturday is children’s day. It is an
unfortunate day for big and important work ... The morning is good on
Sunday but the afternoon is evil and dangerous. It is therefore fady to work on
Sunday, especially in the afternoon. (Ruud, 1960: 32–35)
1. Introduction
Habits, customs and norms have had important consequences on economic
behaviour, welfare and wellbeing throughout world history (Landes, 1998;
Diamond, 1998; Putnam et al., 1993; Kay, 2004).
1 For example, Austen (2003)
examines the link between culture and labour markets. Based on cross-country
evidence, he ﬁnds that cultural norms inﬂuence unemployment and the wage
structure in economies in his sample. Platteau (1994) argues that the cultural
endowment of a society determines its economic growth trajectory. While the link
between culture and economic behaviour and outcomes has received little attention
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 in economics, it has played a prominent role in the anthropology and sociology
literature. Although anthropologists and sociologists usually ﬁnd large eﬀects on
people’s behaviour and wellbeing, they often fail to illustrate results at a large
statistical representative scale due to lack of adequate tools and/or data.
2
Only recently have economists started looking at explanations and eﬀects of
speciﬁc beliefs, superstition and taboos. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and Be ´ nabou
and Tirole (2007) develop theoretical models to explain the persistence of
superstition and taboos while Do and Phung (2006), Rohlfs et al. (2010), Wong
and Yung (2005), and Lee (2005) look empirically at eﬀects of superstition. In this
article, we analyse empirically the relationship between taboos and agriculture and
household consumption in Madagascar using a recent comprehensive nationally
representative household survey. Madagascar is a good place to study this linkage as
it is characterised by multiple taboos (called fady
3), often associated with eating
habits and burial practices.
We study the eﬀect of a particular work taboo whereby individuals are not
allowed to work on speciﬁc days (called fady days).
4 Using data from the 2004
national household survey, we ﬁnd that 18 per cent of the population of agricultural
households has two or more fady days per week and that an extra fady day is
associated with 6 per cent lower per capita consumption and 5 per cent lower rice
productivity, controlling for human and physical characteristics.
5 This association is
statistically signiﬁcant whether we use individually reported fady days or the village
average.
What is unclear is whether the association between productivity and observance of
fady can be given a causal interpretation. In particular, we would like to know
whether the elimination of work taboos would increase consumption and
productivity. This is a diﬃcult question since we do not have truly exogenous
variation in fady observance. We seek to address it in two ways. First, we note that
fady observance varies systematically with the extent to which local communities
have been targeted by missionary eﬀorts. This suggests using religion as an
(imperfect) instrument for fady observance. Using this approach, we again ﬁnd a
strong association between productivity and instrumented fady observance. We
cannot, however, be certain that conversion does not proxy for something else that
aﬀects both productivity and villagers’ desire to observe fady days, such as proximity
to cities and better market opportunities.
To circumvent this diﬃculty, we turn to a second approach that relies on variation
in labour demand across households. The logic behind this approach is as follows.
Suppose there are more observed fady days in a village. This penalises more those
households with more land per person. Hence the negative eﬀect of fady days on
labour use should be stronger among land-rich households. We estimate a model
where household land and proxies for work opportunities are interacted with village
fady days. Since we include village ﬁxed eﬀects, factors such as proximity to cities
and better market opportunities are controlled for. We ﬁnd that interaction terms
are statistically signiﬁcant with the anticipated sign, suggesting that households with
a higher land per manpower ratio are more likely to be constrained by local work
taboos. We similarly ﬁnd that educated households are less likely to abide by – and
be constrained by – work taboos. These results provide our strongest evidence that
work taboos negatively aﬀect agricultural productivity in Madagascar.




































































 The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the meaning and
importance of taboos in Madagascar. After describing the data in Section 3, we map
out the conceptual framework and the strategies employed to test the relationship
between fady days and household consumption and agricultural production in
Section 4. In doing so, we discuss the market failures that are consistent with the
observed outcomes. In Section 5, we present the results of these tests. We ﬁnish with
some concluding remarks.
2. Taboos in Madagascar
Madagascar is a country oﬀ the African coast that was settled relatively late. The
earliest known traces of human communities date only from AD 800 (Wright and
Rakotoarisoa, 2003). The modern Malagasy people have a complex ancestry, with
ancestors mainly drawn from Indonesia and eastern Africa. While all Malagasy speak
one common language, around 20 ethnic groups are still distinguished (Ramamonji-
soa, 2002). The groups are identiﬁed by common traditions and group identity.
The importance of taboos cannot be understated in Madagascar (Van Gennep,
1904; Verin, 1990; Bloch, 1971; Ottino, 1986; Brown, 1999; Proﬁta, 1978). This is
well worded by Ruud (1960), an anthropologist who spent 20 years in Madagascar
and the author of a seminal work on taboos: ‘A European who lives in the country,
mixes with the Natives, and speaks their language every day, will soon discover that
the taboos are omnipresent. If he clashes with them, he will ﬁnd himself up against a
wall of diﬃculties. If he is ignorant of these compact and massive rules, he will meet
with many unpleasant experiences’ (Ruud, 1960). A taboo or fady can be translated
as a prohibition, referring to what one is not allowed to do, objects which one must
not come into contact, words which must not be uttered and places which must be
avoided (Ruud, 1960). The transgressor becomes taboo himself to his environment
and his fellows.
Fady are generally observed for two reasons. First, they are a means through
which individuals display respect for their ancestors and for their elders (Brown,
1999). Taboos link individuals to their ancestors and living relatives. Sharing the
same taboos allows people to identify with their clans and/or ethnic groups
(Lambek, 1992). By not observing ancestral fady, or by observing them only
selectively, individuals bring dishonour to their ancestors and can ﬁnd themselves
socially alienated from their community (Ruud, 1960). It is possible to draw
inferences regarding the social relationships that a person values most highly
through fady observance. By passing down lineage and societal norms to their
children in the form of taboos, elders use their authority to naturalise the existing
order (Brown, 1999).
Second, fady are often adhered to out of fear. People believe that violating their
fady invites misfortune in the form of illness, crop failure, or even death. In her case
study in the north-east of Madagascar, Brown (1999) found that most of the villagers
who did not admit to violating or abandoning a fady, said that there was one simple
reason for their adherence – fear of leprosy. Almost everyone in her study region was
convinced that this illness is the outcome of eating a particular fady food.
Ruud (1960) gives a comprehensive overview of the fady that existed in the 1960s.
They include fady related to hospitality, habits regarding eating plants and animals,




































































 behaviour towards elders, burial and child-rearing practices, agricultural activities,
and so forth. Most of them are still largely observed and are believed to have an
important inﬂuence on the behaviour of Malagasy people today. For example, fady
may be an important element aﬀecting deforestation. Under local customs of
indigenous populations all over the south, forests are treated with respect and fear as
they are the place where sacred forces and spirits live (WWF, 2000; Fenn et al., 1999;
Moizot, 1997). But this does not seem to aﬀect migrants who are less bound by the
social and customary fady of their place of residence and thus, as argued by Faroux
(2001), are more destructive of forests than the local population and more than they
would be themselves towards forest resources in their natal villages. The eﬀect of
fady can in some cases be quite dramatic. For example, in areas around Mananjara
in the south-east of the country, it is fady to accept twins in the household as they are
associated with bad luck. Twins are therefore abandoned immediately after birth.
6
In this article, we will speciﬁcally address the relationship between agriculture and
consumption and the observance of fady days. Fady days are among the many
customs in Madagascar determined by the vintana (destiny) system, which is
pervasive over the island. In general, the vintana system requires that sowing and
harvesting, marriage and burial, and various kinds of important work must take
place, or not take place, on certain days of the week. Any given day may be lucky or
unlucky. As illustrated in the quote at the beginning of the article, every day and
every month has its vintana character. For many Malagasy it is impossible – even
unthinkable – to oppose the vintana power as it is almighty (Ruud, 1960).
7
According to the cosmologic conception of Malagasy society, a month has 28 days
and starts with the new moon and ends with the wane of the moon. A month is
generally divided in four weeks. Not only do months, weeks and days have deﬁnite
destinies that must be observed, hours of the day can also have importance. By
studying the vintana, people know what is good or bad, and what is useful or
harmful. They frequently take this into account in their everyday activities. These
practices are still widely observed today, especially in rural areas where most of the
poor live (Brown, 1999; Bloch, 1971; Verin, 1990).
Solondraibe (1988) studied the origins of fady days in the southern highlands. He
found that they mostly arise for two reasons. First, the ombiasa (traditional priests)
impose speciﬁc days that people are not allowed to work, as part of their vintana.
These days are part of the general taboos for larger communities, called fadibe.
Second, some days are made fady by speciﬁc families or groups after some dramatic
event happened and the family believes that by starting a fady day, it will avoid
having these events repeat themselves. For example, Solondraibe (1988) mentions
that death by lightning may be regarded as a sign that the family should not work on
that particular day any more.
Based on anthropological literature, there seems to exist a strong link between
ethnicity and the observance of fady days.
8 For example, Jarosz (1994) illustrates the
case for the Sihanaka ethnic group in the eastern part of Madagascar. This ethnic
group is prohibited to work on days 1, 4, and 7 of a 12-day cycle. The prohibition
extends to seasonal and permanently hired workers. Le Bourdiec (1974) found that
the Sakalava ethnic group is not allowed to work on the land on Tuesday and
Thursday. On top of this, they are not allowed to work on Fridays due to their
religion, which leaves them only four working days in the week. Solondraibe (1988)




































































 studied fady days within the Betsileo tribe. He found that the number of fady days
within this tribe varies signiﬁcantly. Brown (1999) observed fady days with the
Betsimisaraka ethnic group in the east of the country. In contrast with other
researchers, she states that her studied population show some ﬂexibility and treat
fady days with pragmatism: ‘Many people, once they marry, begin to work on those
days that used to be fady for them because, in combining their fady days with those
of the spouse, they simply do not have enough time to get all their work done’
(Brown, 1999). Brown (1999) further shows that husband and wives respond to
separate authorities. Similarly, neighbours might have separate taboo days, dictated
by separate ancestral rules and passed down through separate elders. These ﬁeld
observations suggest that while fady days are largely dictated by custom, there is
nevertheless an element of agency that should be kept in mind when examining the
data.
9
In the face of the extensive prevalence of fady observance in Madagascar, this
paper is a modest attempt to consider the eﬀects of one particular type of fady
(namely days for which family members in rural areas are not permitted to work on
the farm). Before describing the framework we adopt to identify these eﬀects, we
turn to a description of the data and some initial summary statistics.
3. Data
Our main source of information to study the link between fady days and agricultural
productivity and consumption is the 2004 Enqueˆte Prioritaire Aupre`s des Me´nages
(EPM), a nationally representative integrated household survey of 5,454 households.
The data were collected during the months of September 2003 and January and
February 2004. The sample was selected through a multi-stage sampling technique in
which strata are deﬁned by faritany (province) and milieu (rural centres, secondary
urban centres, and primary urban centres), and primary sampling units are
communes. Each of the communes was selected systematically with probability
proportional to size. In the analysis sampling weights, deﬁned as the inverse
probability of selection, are used to obtain accurate population estimates.
The comprehensive household questionnaire includes sections on education,
health, employment, housing, agriculture, non-agricultural enterprises, and house-
hold expenditures and assets. The agriculture section is particularly detailed for a
nationally representative survey as it contains plot- and crop-level information. For
a measure of household wellbeing, in this analysis we use the estimated household-
level consumption aggregate constructed by the Institut National de la Statistique
(INSTAT). Because the main variable of interest in this study is the number of fady
days (‘What is the number of fady days for your household per week – that is
number of days you are not permitted to work?’), we limit our analysis to households
that were asked that question – those in the agricultural section of the survey. There
are 3,454 farming households in total.
Just over 21 per cent of households in our sample reported that, due to fady,
household members were not permitted to work one day per week (see Table 1).
Some 18 per cent reported two or more fady days a week. At ﬁrst glance, this might
seem not extraordinarily high, as most employed people in developed countries
typically take two days oﬀ each week. It is important to keep in mind, however, that




































































 agriculture is characterised by high seasonal demand for labour.
10 The fady-day
constraint on household supply of labour is not likely binding during the slack
periods of the agricultural calendar. But during the peak months (that is ﬁeld
preparation, planting, transplanting, and harvest), the inability to fully tap into the
supply of family and hired labour is likely to have negative agricultural productivity
and consumption consequences. The evidence indeed indicates that across house-
holds average rice yields are lower – and poverty rates higher – when the number of
fady days is high (see Table 1). For example, average rice yields for households with
two fady days are 11 per cent lower than for those with one fady day, and the poverty
rate is 6 per cent higher.
4. Conceptual Framework
While illustrative, the relationship depicted in Table 1 could be deceiving, that is
driven by a third factor that is correlated with both fady days and consumption/
productivity. We address this possibility using a variety of strategies. The ﬁrst part of
our analysis seeks to identify the average eﬀect of fady days on consumption and
agricultural productivity. The second examines how fady days aﬀect diﬀerent
households diﬀerently.
In the ﬁrst part of our analysis, we begin by simply regressing household
consumption and agricultural production on the reported number of fady days and
several household controls. This shows a strong conditional correlation between
reported fady days and welfare.
This approach is not entirely satisfactory because unobserved heterogeneity at the
village level may be correlated with fady observance and household consumption.
This could arise for instance if villages that are more backward and isolated are also
poorer and more respectful of taboos. Indeed, it could be optimal for households in
more productive villages to observe fewer fady days. Although we attempt to control
for some of the sources of these productivity diﬀerences such as soil quality and
educational attainment, others such as rainfall, access to rivers, and other
dimensions of human capital are missed.
11 Allowing for this possibility by estimating
village ﬁxed eﬀects models, the strong conditional correlation remains between
reported fady days and welfare.
Next we investigate if fady days reported by the household are correlated with
unobserved household characteristics that drive consumption income. For instance,
Table 1. Number of weekly fady days
Number of fady days Per cent of Poverty Rice
per week households rate yields*
0 60.3 77.3 2,671
1 21.4 76.1 2,316
2 12.9 80.6 2,066
3 4.3 79.1 1,870
4 1.2 84.4 1,565
Total 100 77.6 2,484
Notes: *Kilograms per hectare.




































































 more prosperous households may have less time to respect fady, and thus may report
lesser fady obligations.
12 To assess whether such a bias is aﬀecting the results, we re-
estimate the model by replacing the household reported number of fady days with
the village average.
13 Although, identiﬁcation of the productivity eﬀects of fady in
this model derives entirely from between village variation, the advantage of this
approach is that the village average of fady days also captures how the overall
village-level labour market constraints aﬀect households. The idea is that the more
fady days there are at the village level, the more the supply of labour is restricted in
the village, aﬀecting both farm and non-farm production of surveyed households. As
noted previously, the seasonal character of labour demand among agricultural
households means that labour constraints are likely to bind at least part of the year,
and individual households may seek to overcome labour constraints by hiring
labour.
14 Such a strategy will fail, however, if the observance of fady days by other
households in the same village restricts the availability of hired labour. Replacing
individually reported fady days with the village average controls for this possibility.
15
Replacing self-reported fady days by the village average does not eliminate all
possible sources of endogeneity however. One particular concern is that villages that
got wealthier in recent decades may be abandoning their fady practices. To address
this concern, we re-estimate the model using an instrumental variable approach in
which the excluded instrument is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the
household head follows a traditional religion. The assumptions needed for this
instrument to be valid are discussed in detail in the next section.
The second part of our empirical analysis focuses on the heterogeneous eﬀect of
village average fady days on diﬀerent households. To identify the relationship
between community-level fady days and household consumption, we have so far
relied on variation across villages, thereby ruling out the use of village ﬁxed eﬀects.
As noted previously, this is not entirely satisfactory. As such, in the second part of
our analysis we introduce village ﬁxed eﬀects into these models. Although this means
that the average eﬀect of work taboos is no longer identiﬁed, we can still test for the
existence of a negative eﬀect of fady days by focusing on heterogeneous eﬀects
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001). The idea is that work taboos aﬀect diﬀerent households
diﬀerently. Agricultural households that have a lot of manpower relative to land are
less likely to be constrained by work taboos than those with a lot of land relative to
their manpower. This follows because whether the fady constraint is binding depends
on a household’s demand for labour. To illustrate this, initially consider the absence
of labour markets. In this case, each household has its own shadow wage which is
determined by the household’s internal demand for and supply of labour. On the
supply side, fady observance reduces supply for a given household size, which
consequently raises the shadow wage with other things being equal. On the demand
side, the larger the land holdings relative to household size, the more demand there is
for labour relative to household size. As such, fady is more likely to bind – that is, to
push up the household shadow wage – for farmers with larger land holdings. This
implies that fady days are more likely to bind for households with a low labour to
land ratio. Introducing the existence of a labour market at the level of the village can
in principle ease the constraint for individual households.
16 But as long as fady days
bind for a large enough proportion of households, they will adversely aﬀect village
labour supply and hence the village wage rate. Fady induced diﬀerences in the village




































































 wage rate will then have a larger impact on farmers who demand more labour
because of a low labour to land ratio.
Whether taboos are constraining can thus be investigated by testing whether
households with a high labour to land ratio are less aﬀected by village norms
regarding fady days than households with a low labour-land ratio. We also suspect
that more educated heads of household are less likely to believe in taboos and
superstition. Hence they are more likely to ignore them and hence less likely to be
constrained by fady days.
17
To test for heterogeneous eﬀects of fady days, we estimate a reduced-form model of
demandforfamilylabour.Becausetheinformationavailableinthedataislimitedtoan
indicator of whether family labour was used on the plot, we estimate a logit model of
demand for family labour.
18 Since we also control for village ﬁxed eﬀects, we cannot
estimate the eﬀect of the average number of fady days observed in the village.
This test is best illustrated with the following simpliﬁed equation for a reduced
form plot-speciﬁc household demand for family labour (FL),









þ b3ðEÞþb4ðE   fadyÞþb5ðxÞþe;
Where L
T, the ratio of household labour (adult equivalents) per are of land,
19
represents the availability of family labour; fady is the village average number of fady
days; E is an indicator of household educational attainment; and x represents other
explanatory variables. Village fady days are used to test two types of heterogeneous
eﬀects b2 and b4.
First, we test if fady norms aﬀect households of varying sizes (relative to land
holdings) diﬀerently by using the interaction between the village average fady days
and the number of adult equivalent household members per are of cultivable land
(L
T   fady). A positive coeﬃcient for the interaction (b240) implies that fady norms
are more constraining for households with few members relative to their land
holdings.
20
Second, the interaction between the village average fady days and household
education (E   fady) is included as a way of testing how diﬀerential degrees of respect
for fady aﬀect demand for household labour diﬀerently. A dummy variable for at
least one member of the household with a secondary or post-secondary level of
education (E) is used as a proxy for household education. A positive coeﬃcient
(b440) for the interaction term implies that those with less education (more respect
for fady) are more constrained by the number of fady days observed in the village
than those with more education.
21 This would arise if more educated households
disregard fady taboos during the agricultural peak season.
5. Results
5.1. Average Eﬀects
We begin by estimating standard OLS (Ordinary Least Square) models (Table 2) in
which the dependent variable is the log of per capita household consumption – the
measure of household ‘expenditures’ commonly used to calculate poverty. In

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 addition to the number of fady days reported by the household, we include
household controls to correct for possible omitted variable bias. These controls
include household demographics, education, and a series of ethnicity and region
dummies. The default ethnic group is the biggest, the Merina. Because we suspect
that respect for fady days is stronger in isolated communities and isolated
communities are poorer, we include dummies for geographical isolation quintiles.
Information on transportation costs was collected in the 2001 commune census
conducted by Cornell University. The variables used here are the quintiles of the cost
of transporting a 50 kilogram sack of rice to the nearest urban centre to which
commune members travel.
The estimated coeﬃcient on the number of reported fady days indicates that a 6
per cent lower household consumption is associated with each extra fady day. The
magnitude of the estimate is similar (5%) in the village ﬁxed eﬀects model (model 2).
Estimated coeﬃcients for control variables are as expected and as documented in
previous poverty analysis in Madagascar (for example Razaﬁndravonona et al.,
2001). As such we do not comment on them here, though it is interesting to note that
almost none of the ethnic variables is signiﬁcant, indicating that most of the
variation in consumption between ethnic groups is accounted for by the included
regressors, including variation in remoteness.
As noted in section 4, a concern with these results is that fady days reported by the
household may be correlated with unobserved household characteristics that
determine household consumption. To correct for this, we re-estimate the model
using the village average number of fady days as a proxy for the village norm and for
the resulting village labour market constraints. Results are shown in model 3 of
Table 2. The number of village fady days has an even larger correlation with
household consumption: one extra fady day is associated with 16 per cent lower
household consumption on average. To check whether these results are driven by
migrating households, we re-estimate the model without all households having
migrated to their current place of residence in the last ﬁve years. Virtually identical
results are obtained; they are not shown here to save space.
Next we seek to instrument fady days. A main source of endogeneity may be that
respondents rationalise their underemployment as a result of respect for fady.A s
such, the direction of causality can go either way: fady appears to cause
underemployment, while underemployment may cause respondents to report fady.
To correct for this, we need a variable that explains fady but does not cause
underemployment. For this purpose, we use adherence to traditional religions as an
instrument for the observance of fady days. Although this is the only reasonable
instrument we could ﬁnd given the available data, it is important to realise its
limitations.
As shown in Table 3, conversion to Christianity satisﬁes the inclusion restriction:
the Christian faith discourages the observance of taboos, a point that is borne out by
the data. Furthermore, since conversion to Christianity started a long time ago in
Madagascar, it cannot be suspected of simultaneity bias with the current observance
of traditional taboos – that is respondents did not convert last year in order not to
follow fady days.
But adherence to traditional religions may nevertheless be correlated with
location-speciﬁc characteristics – such as socio-economic success – that aﬀect labour




































































 demand and therefore the shadow cost of respecting fady. The overall African
anthropological record seems to indicate that where conversion to various Christian
faiths took place, it might have been correlated with socio-economic change. Given
this potential problem, we look at the historical literature to better understand
Christian conversion in Madagascar.
The historical literature (Raison-Jourde, 1991; Huebsch, 1993; Brown, 2002)
agrees that most early placements of missionaries in the country were driven by
political objectives, that is ﬁrst the Anglicans/London Missionary Society (LMS)
tried to get hold of the Merina elite, the rulers of the country. In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, placements were mostly driven by growing political
competition between the Anglicans/Quakers on the one hand and the Catholics on
the other – in many cases they just tried to get missionaries into the villages already
covered by the respective other missionary societies (the LMS also tried to get the
Catholics expelled under Merina rule and the Catholics paid back in kind when the
French took over).
Although some systematic patterns have been documented, subsequent conversion
eﬀorts do not appear to have been systematically conﬁned to a particular region or
Table 3. Reported number of fady days Logit Model. (dep. var.¼two or more fady days)
Variable Marg. eﬀect z-stat
a





Other religion 70.027 71.49
Female-headed household (dummy) 70.031 72.74***
Age of household head 70.001 71.37
Number of household members (adult equivalents) 70.001 70.44
HH member with at least secondary educ. (dummy) 70.035 71.71*
Remoteness Quintile




Least remote 0.029 1.26
Ethnicity dummies (18) yes
Region dummies (21) yes
Number of observations 3,443
F-test for model 9.32
- p-value 0.00
F-tests for dummies included but not shown
Ethnicities - F(17, 232) 0.9
- p-value 0.61
Regions - F(21, 228) 5.7
- p-value 0.00
Notes:
az-values based on robust standard errors adjusted for two-stage sampling design;
bRemoteness deﬁned by cost of transporting 50 kg sack of rice to major urban market;
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level; **signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level; ***signiﬁcant at the 1
per cent level.




































































 social class. Raison-Jourde (1991) argues that missionaries preferred to target
villages where people were sedentary and where the state was present. These villages
may have been wealthier but there is no conclusive evidence and record on this.
Within villages, poor as well as rich people were targeted as missionaries aimed at
converting as many people as possible (Lupo, 1996). Brown (2002) argues that
Protestants and Catholics followed diﬀerent conversions paths. Protestants went
mostly for the higher castes while Catholics aimed mostly at the lower castes of the
population as well as the coastal areas because they were more important in
numbers. For example, Lupo (1996) shows that the majority of early Catholic
converts were slaves. These were attracted to Catholicism given the potential
promised abolition of slavery, as it was contrary to Christian beliefs of human
equality. Conversion eﬀorts thus appear to have been targeted at multiple ends of the
social scale both across and within villages.
To summarise, missionary activity in Madagascar was largely driven by non-
economic considerations, such as political objectives and a strategy of mass
conversions. No intentional relationship should therefore exist between wealth and
conversion to Christian faith. Albeit not perfect,
22 the traditional faith variable is
therefore not a totally unreasonable instrument for measuring adherence to fady
days.
In Table 3 we show the results of regressing fady days on religion dummies and the
household controls. The logit model relates households with two or more fady days
with religion dummies.
23 The same controls as Table 2 appear in the regression,
namely age and gender of the household head, number of household members,
ethnicity dummies, region dummies, and isolation quintiles.
24
Results show that, as anticipated, Christian households report fewer fady days
than those following traditional religious traditions. The eﬀect of religion is strongly
signiﬁcant, indicating that the variable satisﬁes the inclusion restriction. Male-
headed households are more likely to adhere to fady days than female-headed
households. Higher levels of education are associated with fewer fady days.
Household size and the age of the head of the household do not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect.
Instrumental variable regression results for household consumption are reported
in Table 4. The eﬀect of village fady days remains signiﬁcant whether we used
household responses (with or without village ﬁxed eﬀects) or average village fady
days. The magnitude of the IV model coeﬃcient estimates suggests a large impact of
47 per cent less household consumption for an extra fady day. While these results do
not totally eliminate the possibility of endogeneity bias, they nevertheless
demonstrate that the association between consumption and fady days is strong
and not driven by household response bias. They nevertheless remain fragile to the
possibility that conversion to the Christian faith is correlated with unobserved
determinants of income and consumption, a possibility that we ﬁnd unlikely given
the historical context in Madagascar but that we cannot entirely rule out.
We have speculated that the channel through which fady days aﬀect income and
consumption is through labour constraints during the agricultural peak period. To
investigate this idea, we examine the eﬀect of fady days on agricultural production.
Table 5 presents reduced-form estimates of the determinants of rice production
similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 4 for consumption.
25 We focus just on rice














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 production (log of the kilograms of paddy produced per plot) as this is the
predominant crop grown in Madagascar, and as it allows for easier comparison
across plots. In addition to our variables of interest (fady days), controls include land
quality and characteristics, household demographics (to capture the quantity of
household labour that can be supplied in the absence of fady-day constraints), and
education levels (to capture the quality of labour inputs).
26 Estimated coeﬃcients for
these variables are consistent with previous estimates for Madagascar (Stifel and
Minten, 2004), and we do not discuss them here.
In the ﬁrst two models (OLS and village ﬁxed eﬀects) the household fady day
variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd that an extra household fady
day is associated with 5 per cent lower rice productivity, all other things being equal.
The next speciﬁcation (Model 3) is again motivated by the possibility that
household-reported fady day are correlated with some unobserved household
characteristic that also aﬀects household rice production. A 14 per cent fall in rice
Table 7. Partial change in the probability of family labour use Village Fixed Eﬀects Logit
Number of adult equivalents per are







aThe conversion is 100 are per hectare.






Interaction – Village fady days * HH size per are
c of land 0.08 1.74*
Interaction – Village fady days * HH member
with at least secondary education
0.09 2.03**
Interaction – Village fady days * Migrant household 0.04 0.70
HH size (adult equiv) per are of land 0.03 0.26
HH member with at least secondary education (dummy) 70.10 72.47**
Household migrated within past 5 years (dummy) 70.09 71.73*
Plot size (log hectares) 0.08 4.75***
Female-headed household (dummy) 0.01 0.18
Age of household head 70.001 71.44
Number of household members (adult equivalents) 0.02 2.65***
Topography, soil and slope dummies (12) yes




2 test for soil dummies included but not shown (chi
2(12)) 65.4
Notes:
aMarginal eﬀects for interaction terms are with respect to a change in fady days;
bz-
values based on robust standard errors adjusted for two-stage sampling design;
cThe conversion
is 100 are per hectare; *Signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level; **signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level;
***signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.




































































 production is associated with each extra average village fady day. The remaining
three models are the same as the ﬁrst three, except that the fady variable is
instrumented, as before, using the traditional religion dummy. Coeﬃcient estimates
for fady days remain negative and signiﬁcant but are larger in magnitude.
27 These
ﬁndings are subject to the same caveats as those discussed for the consumption
regression, but they nevertheless suggest that agricultural production may be a
channel through which fady days and household consumption are related.
5.2. Heterogeneous Eﬀects
Identiﬁcation of the average eﬀect of fady days requires the assumption that
household-reported fady days are exogenous or that village ﬁxed eﬀects can be
ignored. Despite eﬀorts to control for household level endogeneity using
instrumental variables, neither assumption is entirely satisfactory. In our search
for evidence of a causal eﬀect of fady days on agricultural productivity, we now turn
to a heterogeneous eﬀects model and estimate the model of demand for family
labour outlined in section 4. Because the information available in the data is limited
to an indicator of whether family labour was used on each plot, we estimate a
reduced-form logit model. We control for unobserved village heterogeneity by
including village ﬁxed-eﬀects. Results are reported in Table 6.
The positive and signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects estimates for the two interaction
terms in Table 6 indicate that smaller households and those with less education
employ less family labour in villages where the average number of fady days
is higher.
28 Two points of clariﬁcation are needed to understand these estimates
fully.
First, the interaction marginal eﬀects that appear in the table are calculated as the
average of the partial
29 changes in the probability of family labour use due to a one-
day increase in fady days (holding household size/education constant). We use the
term partial because it measures the eﬀect of fady on family labour use only through
the interaction eﬀect.
30 For the household size-fady interaction, this means that we
evaluate the probability change for each observation, setting the household size per
are of land equal to one, and then take the average of the changes over the entire
sample.
Second, because these are partial changes in the probabilities, the appropriate way
to interpret them is to compare the marginal eﬀects of fady for the constrained
households (for example, the ones with few adults per are of land) relative to
unconstrained households. The diﬀerence in marginal eﬀects is a measure of the
eﬀect of the constraint on labour use.
Regarding the household size relative to land holdings, it makes little sense to
consider households with no adults. As such, we estimate the interaction marginal
eﬀects of fady for various household sizes and present them in Table 7. Thus the 0.08
marginal eﬀect for a household with one adult per are of land can be compared to
the 0.05 for a household with one adult for two are of land (or 0.5 adults per are of
land – that is a smaller household). This tells us that the household with more land
and/or fewer adults (0.5 adults per are) is 3 per cent less likely to use family labour
for rice production than the household with less land and/or more adults (1 adult per
are) in villages with one additional fady day. Similarly, a household with one adult




































































 per are of land is 8 per cent less likely to use family labour than a household with two
adults per are of land for a one day increase in the village fady average (0.16 – 0.08).
These estimates suggest that households with more land per adult member are
aﬀected more by the local fady norms, probably because they are more labour
constrained. This eﬀect of fady days is progressively redistributive within villages as
the more prosperous (based on more land holdings) are more negatively inﬂuenced
by fady-induced labour constraints. Although this leads to lower intra-village
inequality, it does so at the expense of growth by merely pulling everyone to the
bottom.
The opposite conclusion, however, follows from the interaction eﬀect for educated
households. The marginal eﬀect in Table 6 illustrates the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of
fady norms between the constrained and unconstrained households and suggests
those constrained households are those with a lower level of education. Households
without secondary or post-secondary levels of education are 9 per cent less likely
than educated households to use family labour in villages with a one-day higher
observance in fady days. This suggests that households with low levels of education
are more likely to respect fady norms and are more negatively aﬀected than
households with higher levels of education.
6. Conclusions
Although cultural practices and customs often have important consequences for
consumption and economic performance, they are seldom studied by economists. To
ﬁll this gap, we study the impact of taboos on consumption and agriculture in
Madagascar. Madagascar provides a good case study because of the prevalence of
taboos in everyday life and the variation in cultural practices across the country. We
analyse the eﬀects of days during which it is taboo to work (fady days) on agriculture
and consumption. Using data from a nationally representative household survey, we
ﬁnd that 18 per cent of agricultural households report two or more fady days per
week and that an extra fady day is associated with 6 per cent lower per capita
household consumption and 5 per cent lower rice productivity.
We adopt complementary strategies to address the potential endogeneity of fady
days. First, average eﬀects of fady days are estimated using an instrumental variables
approach in which traditional religion serves as instrument. In the context of
Madagascar, this is a reasonable instrumentation strategy given the data constraints,
albeit not a fully convincing one because there may remain village-level factors that
aﬀect both fady observance and welfare. To deal with this possibility, we introduce
village ﬁxed eﬀects and turn our attention to the presence of heterogeneous eﬀects
across households. We ﬁnd that smaller households and those with less education
employ less labour in villages with high fady observance. These results suggest that
fady norms impose constraints on labour use that diﬀerentially aﬀect diﬀerent
households.
Although we estimate the eﬀect of one particular taboo (fady days), other taboos
are widespread in rural areas and aﬀect agricultural practices throughout
Madagascar. Freudenberger (1999), for example, illustrates how the required
slaughtering of cows for funerals, can lead to a vicious circle of deepening poverty in
the case of quickly succeeding deaths of family members. She also shows that this




































































 happens despite villagers reporting a lack of manure as the main constraint on rice
productivity in her study area. In some other areas, it has been found that it is taboo
to transport manure, generally perceived as a major constraint to improved
agricultural productivity in Africa (Barrett et al., 2002). Solondraibe (1988) shows
widespread taboos to cultivate even fertile land in speciﬁc areas. Moser and Barrett
(2003) further ﬁnd economically and statistically signiﬁcant social conformity eﬀects,
that is Malagasy smallholders choose their cultivation practices in part to conform to
local behavioural norms, even if it means sacriﬁcing gains in expected rice output.
Finally, Barrett (2005) illustrates how the adoption of improved rice technologies is
hindered because it departs from the ‘way of the ancestors’ and although highland
farmers say they cannot aﬀord inorganic fertilisers, they routinely pay extraordinary
sums to exhume and re-shroud dead ancestors every three to ﬁve years, a ceremony
known as famandihana.
We analyse the negative eﬀects of taboos. Nonetheless, there could be gains from
taboos that are not analysed here. For example, food taboos have been the subject of
a large body of research. Harris and Ross (1987) highlighted the beneﬁts of some
food taboos towards survival. Other taboos might reﬂect received wisdom for social
goods. For example, Colding and Folke (2001) synthesise information on resource
and habitat taboos and ﬁnd that they often oﬀer clear beneﬁts towards resource
conservation and management. In Madagascar in particular, Fauroux (2001) found
that under local customs of original populations all over the south, forests are
treated with respect and fear as it is the place where sacred forces and spirits live.
These beliefs might thus contribute to reducing deforestation.
31 Additionally, Jarosz
(1994) speculates that taboo days play an important unifying social role and that it
was a way of expressing resistance against state-imposed cultivation calendars. She
also argues that ‘the adherence to taboos preserves human resources in a period
when work intensiﬁes and labour demands are increasingly placed on people who
already work from dawn to dusk’ (1994: 449). In the Lac Alaotra area in particular
(where she did her ﬁeld survey), farmers are not allowed to cultivate rice cultivation
on fady days, but can do other activities such as small-scale commerce. The
imposition of these days might thus also have contributed to the spreading of risk.
Taboos and other customs introduce constraints and aﬀect the ﬂexibility of input
markets. They can contribute to poverty and low agricultural productivity. This
appears to be the case in Madagascar. Our analysis thus contributes empirical
evidence from the agricultural ﬁeld to the international literature on social capital
and norms that has been shown to potentially have important eﬀects on economic
prosperity and on development (for example, North, 1990; Keefer and Knack, 1997;
Woolcock, 1998; Zak and Knack, 2001; Aharonovitz and Nyaga, 2010).
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1. For example, Landes (1998) shows that much of the increase in life expectancy in the twentieth century
has come from clean water, expeditious waste removal and improvements in personal cleanliness.
Before the knowledge of germ theory, the great killer was gastro-intestinal diseases, transmitted from
waste to hands to food. Groups that then washed their hands before eating, due to their religion, such
as Jews and Muslims, had signiﬁcantly lower disease and death rates.
2. To get at the eﬀect of norms and network eﬀects, economists have studied the impact of ethnicity on
economic performance, often ﬁnding no eﬀect when other explanatory variables, especially education
and location, are taken into consideration (Fafchamps, 2000; Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001;
Collier and Garg, 1999). Others have addressed the eﬀects of racial background on wellbeing and
economic performance (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; Bodenhorn, 1999; Darity et al., 1995). While
some of this research may be controversial, other explanations for diﬀerences in economic
performance or wellbeing are generally accepted, such as education, geography, environment and
the like (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup and Sachs, 1998).
3. The Malagasy word fady is of Indonesian origin (Ruud, 1960): in the Maanjab language (Borneo), the
corresponding word is padi (taboo); in the ngaddju language (Borneo), it is plai. The Polynesian word
taboo has been taken over internationally.
4. Such labour taboos also exist in other developing countries. Danquah and Miller (2007) show that no
farm labor is permitted on Wednesdays for cocao farmers in Ghana. Bartle (1978) shows that no
farming is allowed on ‘dabone’ days in the Akan calendar that is practised in part of Ivory Coast,
Ghana and Togo. Osei (2006) shows that Asante farmers in Ghana are not allowed to work for up to
two weeks on the farm after each death in the community. Taboos in farm labor are sometimes also
associated with gender roles. For example, some Muslim women in Rajput families in India are not
allowed to work on the farm at all (Zakia and Anwar, 1993).
5. The eﬀect of timing on economic performance has also been studied in developed countries. For
example, Thaler (1987a, 1987b) shows the impact of weekends, holidays, turn of the month and
intraday eﬀects on stock performance. Chamberlain et al. (1991) look at the eﬀect of the thirteenth of
the month on investment behavior.
6. Luckily, a local NGO was formed to ﬁnd suitable families/hosts for these abandoned children.
7. Note that this statement refers to vintana power in general, of which fady day observance is a part.
8. The link between ethnicity and diﬀerent types of taboos has also been found in other countries. Their
eﬀects have especially been studied on health care (for example, Addai, 1999), education (for example,
Chimombo, 2005) and nutrition (Shatenstein and Ghadirian, 1998; Aunger, 1992).
9. Jarosz (1994) speculates that taboo days play an important unifying social role and that it was a way
of expressing resistance against state-imposed cultivation calendars. She also argues that ‘the
adherence to taboos preserves human resources in a period when work intensiﬁes and labour demands
are increasingly placed on people who already work from dawn to dusk’ (1994: 449). In the Lac
Aloatra area in particular (where she did her ﬁeld survey), farmers are not allowed to do rice
cultivation but can do other activities on some days such as small-scale commerce. The imposition of
these days might thus also have contributed to the spreading of risk.
10. Madagascar is a rice economy par excellence as documented by diﬀerent studies and datasets (for
example, Minten and Dorosh, 2006). For example, a commune census that was conducted in 2001
shows that rice is the most important crop in the majority of the communes of the country, in terms
of both area and value of production (Minten et al., 2003). The only region where rice is stated to be
less important than other crops is in the eastern part of the country, where cash crops are a more
important source of incomes, and the south where maize and cassava are the main crops. The latter
region is characterised by a drier climate that makes rice production more problematic than in the
rest of the country. Rice production is little mechanised and is highly labour-intensive, with strong
peaks in labour demand as rice is mostly cultivated in only one season in the year. It is estimated at
the national level that almost three quarters of the Malagasy rice production happens in four
months, that is between March and June (Minten and Dorosh, 2006). The number of lowlands
where double rice harvests are possible is relatively limited, due to lack of irrigation and to water
problems. The lowlands where two rice harvests are possible are mostly found in the west of the
country.
11. We thank an anonymous referee for making this point.




































































 12. Another concern is that more traditional households may simultaneously be more likely to adhere to
fady days and less likely to adopt modern agricultural technologies. In an eﬀort to address this
concern, we included use of modern inputs as regressors in the agricultural production regressions.
The results were insigniﬁcant and thus not reported here. This is likely due to the fact only 12 per cent
of respondents reported using modern methods.
13. The household’s reported fady days are omitted from the village average. Further, a detailed analysis
of the distributions of reported fady days within villages indicates that there do not exist villages in
which the average masks the simultaneous coexistence of concentrations of low and high fady-
observance groups. In other words, the averages genuinely represent central tendencies.
14. For example, as Cogneau and Robilliard (2000) write ‘hiring [labor] is particularly important at the
time of rice transplanting in irrigated rice ﬁelds. On each ﬁeld, this operation must be carried out
quickly, ideally in a day, so that the seedlings grow at the same pace and appropriate water control can
be assured. Typically, rice-grower households call upon paid work or mutual aid during this period.’
15. Note that this speciﬁcation rules out the possibility of estimating village ﬁxed eﬀects models since the
village average fady days would not be identiﬁed.
16. Village-level labour markets that are not nationally integrated are fair to assume given high transport
costs (Stifel and Minten, 2008; and Jacoby and Minten, 2008).
17. Fady days are related to working on the farm and do not restrict schooling activities. As such, while
education levels may aﬀect the degree of fady observance, the number of fady days reported by
households is not likely to aﬀect human capital accumulation.
18. Note that for 25 per cent of plots in the sample, households do not use any household labour and
instead rely entirely on hired labour.
19. The conversion is 100 are per hectare.
20. Note that we expect b150, as a lower labor/land ratio increases the marginal product of labour.
21. More educated individuals may have less cash or credit constraints and thus may be in a better
position to hire labour. This is why household education enters the regression as a separate regressor.
This should not aﬀect the interpretation of the interaction term with fady days.
22. One caveat might exist if there are clear beneﬁts from religious aﬃliation. These could be local-run
projects and political advantages. However, most political parties in Madagascar are not formed along
religious lines and would thus not lead to a systematic relationship. No data are available on the
presence of local church-run projects. Another problem might be that while there is no evidence that
indicates that missionaries were selective at converting villages to Christianity, villages might however
have been diﬀerentially receptive to those eﬀorts, with more productive or richer ones having greater
beneﬁts in accepting conversion or higher opportunity costs in resisting it and less productive
characterised by the reverse conﬁguration. Unfortunately, we have no data at our disposal as to test
and completely eliminate this possibility.
23. Similar regressions of reported number of fady days were also estimated using OLS, Tobit and ordered
probit methods. The results were not qualitatively diﬀerent from those that appear in Table 3 and are
thus not reported here, though they are available from the authors upon request.
24. Although the ethnicity estimates are not presented in the table, 12 out of the 19 ethnic groups in the
data show a signiﬁcant diﬀerent number of fady days than the Merina, the main ethnic group in
Madagascar. They all have more fady days except for the Chinese and Comoron immigrants, who
have signiﬁcantly fewer. As expected, these latter groups are little aﬀected by local customs.
25. While the plot-level data used in this analysis are very detailed for a nationally representative
household survey, they do not include information on quantities of labour and non-labour inputs. As
such, structural estimates of production functions are not possible.
26. Descriptive statistics appear in Appendix Table A2.
27. In addition, the z-statistics for the tests of signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments are 6.7 (p50.001)
and 8.3 (p50.001), indicating that we can have conﬁdence in the exclusion restriction.
28. Roughly 6 per cent of the households in the sample practice sharecropping. To address the eﬀect that
this may have on land (and consequently household size relative to land), the models in Table 6 were
re-estimated using various diﬀerent speciﬁcations to control for sharecropping. These include using
dummy variables for sharecropping, adjusting household land size by the area of land sharecropped,
and estimating the model on the sample of households not practicing sharecropping. The results
reported in Table 6 are robust to these diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model and are thus not reported
here.




































































 We also include an interaction between village fady days and the household’s migrant status. The
rationale is that household with a migrant may be less inclined to follow local customs. As illustrated
in Table 6, this interaction term is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
29. That is we take the average of the following probabilities evaluated for each observation,
Fðx0bÞð1   Fðx0bÞÞxL=TbL=T fady;
where xL/T is the number of adults per are of land (set to one), and bL/T*fady is the estimated coefficient
for the interaction. Ignoring the education interaction for simplicity, note that the change in the
probability of family labour use for a one day increase in village fady observance is
Fðx0bÞð1   Fðx0bÞÞðbfady þ xL=TbL=T fadyÞ:
The difference between the interaction marginal effect and the total change in the probability of family
labor use is the direct effect of fady day observance (F(x0b)( 1 7F(x0b)) (bfady)). This cannot be
estimated because we estimate a fixed effects logit model (that is bfady is differenced out). Thus the
marginal effects reported in Table 5 for the interaction terms are partial changes in the probabilities.
30. Note further that this is diﬀerent from Ai and Norton (2003), who interpret the interaction in a logit
model as a double-diﬀerence.
31. It is especially the migrants that are destructive for forests as they are less bound by social and
customary obligations (Fauroux, 1999).
32. By comparing actual expenditures of the household with self reported welfare levels in the case of
Madagascar, Lokshin et al. (2003) show that this type of subjective assessment is a good alternative
indication of the welfare levels of households in the absence of expenditure measurements.
References
Addai, I. (1999) Ethnicity and contraceptive use in Sub-Saharan Africa: the case of Ghana. Journal of
Biosocial Science, 31, pp. 105–120.
Aharonovitz, G.D. and Nyaga, E.K. (2010) Values, cultural practices, and economic performance: theory
and some evidence from Kenya. World Development, 38(8), pp. 1156–1167.
Ai, C. and Norton, E. (2003) Interaction term in logit and probit models. Economic Letters, 80, pp. 123–
129.
Angrist, J. and Krueger, A. (2001) Instrumental variables and the search for identiﬁcation: from supply
and demand to natural experiments. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), pp. 69–85.
Aunger, R. (1992) The nutritional consequences of rejecting food in the Ituri forest of Zaire. Human
Ecology, 20(3), pp. 263–291.
Austen, S. (2003) Culture and the Labor Market (MA: Elgar).
Barrett, C. (2005) The Social Economics of Poverty (New York: Routledge).
Barrett, C., Place, F. and Aboud, A. (eds) (2002) Natural Resources Management in African Agriculture:
Understanding and Improving Current Practices (UK: CAB International).
Bartle, F.W. (1978) Forty days: the Akan calendar. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute,
48(1), pp. 80–84.
Be ´ nabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2007) Identity, dignity and taboos: beliefs as assets. IZA Discussion Paper no.
2583, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
Bloch, M. (1971) Placing the Dead: Tombs, Ancestral Villages and Kinship Organizations in Madagascar
(New York: Seminar Press).
Bloom, D. and Sachs, J. (1998) Geography, demography and economic growth in Africa. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 207–273.
Bodenhorn, H. (1999) A troublesome caste: height and nutrition of antebellum Virginia’s rural free blacks.
Journal of Economic History, 59(4), pp. 972–996.
Brown, M. (1999) Authority relations and trust: social cohesion on the Eastern Maosala Peninsula,
Madagascar. PhD Dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis.




































































 Brown, M. (2002) A History of Madagascar (NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers).
Chamberlain, T., Chueng, C. S. and Kwan, C. (1991) The Friday the thirteenth eﬀect: myth or reality.
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 30(2), pp. 111–117.
Chimombo, J. (2005) Issues in basic education in developing countries: an exploration of policy options
for improved delivery. Journal of International Cooperation in Education, 18(1), pp. 129–152.
Cogneau, D., and Robilliard, A. (2000) Growth, distribution and poverty in Madagascar: learning from a
microsimulation model in a general equilibrium framework. IFPRI Trade and Macroeconomics
Division Discussion Paper No. 61. International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, DC.
Colding, J. and Folke, C. (2001) Social taboos: ‘invisible’ systems of local resource management and
biological conservation. Ecological Applications, 11(2), pp. 584–600.
Collier, P. and Garg, A. (1999) On kin groups and wages in the Ghanaian labor market. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 61(2), pp. 133–151.
Conley, T. and Udry, C. (2001) Social learning through networks: the adoption of new agricultural
technologies in Ghana. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(3), pp. 668–673.
Cornell, B. and Welch, I. (1996) Culture, information and screening discrimination. Journal of Political
Economy, 104(3), pp. 542–571.
Cutler, D. and Glaeser, E. (1997) Are ghettos good or bad? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), pp.
827–872.
Danquah, F. and Miller, S.K. (2007) Cocoa farming in Ghana: emic experience, etic interpretation.
Southern Rural Sociology, 22(1), pp. 65–79.
Darity, W., Guilkey, D. and Wilfrey, W. (1995) Ethnicity, race and earnings. Economic Letters, 47(3–4),
pp. 401–408.
Diamond, J. (1998) Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company).
Do, Q. and Phung, T.D. (2006) Superstition, family planning and human development. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper no. 4001, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Fafchamps, M. (2000) Ethnicity and credit in African manufacturing. Journal of Development Economics,
61(1), pp. 205–235.
FAOSTAT (2000) FAOSTAT database. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), Rome, Italy. Accessed at http://faostat.fao.org.
Faroux, E. (2001) Dynamiques Migratoires, Tensions Foncie ` res, et De ´ forestation dans l’Ouest Malgache,
in: S. Razanaka, M. Grouzis, P. Milleville, B. Moizot and C. Aubry (eds) Socie´te´s Paysannes,
Transitions Agraires et Dynamiques E ´cologiques dans le Sud-Ouest de Madagascar, Actes de l’Atelier
CNRE – IRD (Antananarivo, Madagascar: Centre National de Recherche sur l’Environnement and
l’Institut de Recherche pour le De ´ veloppement), pp. 91–105.
Fenn, M., Robinson, M., Whyner, D. and Bernard, K. (1999) Les Tendances Actuelles de la Migration des
Peuples et son Impact dans la Re ´ gion E ´ cologique des Fore ˆ ts E ´ pineuses a ` Madagascar. Photocopy,
WWF, Madagascar.
Freudenberger, K. (1999) Livelihoods without livestock: a study of communities and households in the
village of Andaladranovao. Photocopy, LDI, Madagascar.
Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. (2006) Superstition and rational learning. American Economic Review,
96(3), pp. 630–651.
Gallop, J.L. and Sachs, J. (1998) Geography and economic growth, in: B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz (eds)
Proceedings of the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington DC:
World Bank).
Harris, M. and Ross, E. (1987) Food and evolution: toward a theory of human food habits. Wenner-Gren
Foundation for Anthropological Research Symposium.
Herrnstein, R. and Murray, C. (1994) The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life
(New York: Free Press).
Huebsch, B. (ed.) (1993) Madagascar et le Christianisme (Paris: Karthala Press).
Jacoby, H. and Minten, B. (2008) On measuring the beneﬁts of lower transport costs. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper no. 4844, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Jarosz, L. (1994) Taboo and time-work experience in Madagascar. Geographical Review, 84(4), pp. 439–
450.
Kay, J. (2004) Culture and Prosperity: The Truth about Markets – Why Some Nations are Rich but Most
Remain Poor (New York: HarperCollins Publishers).




































































 Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997) Does social capital have an economic payoﬀ? A cross-country
investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), pp. 1251–1288.
La Ferrera, E. (2003) Kin groups and reciprocity: a model of credit transactions in Ghana. American
Economic Review, 39(5), pp. 1730–1751.
Lambek, M. (1992) Taboo as a cultural practice among Malagasy speakers. Man, 27(2), pp. 245–266.
Landes, D. (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company).
Lee, J. (2005) Marriage, female labor supply, and Asian zodiacs. Economic Letters, 87, pp. 427–432.
Le Bourdiec, F. (1974) Hommes et paysages du Riz a ` Madagascar. Photocopy, FTM, Antananarivo.
Lokshin, M., Umapathi, N. and Paternostro, S. (2001) Robustness of subjective welfare analysis in a
poor developing country: Madagascar 2001. World Bank Research Paper no. 2003, World Bank,
Washington, DC.
Lupo, P. (1996) Perception de L’Esclavage dans Quelques Documents Catholiques a ` Madagascar, in:
L’Esclavage a ` Madagascar: Aspects Historiques et Re ´ surgences Contemporaines, Actes du Colloque
International sur l’Esclavage (Antananarivo), pp. 181–190.
Minten, B. and Dorosh, P. (2006) Rice markets in Madagascar in disarray: policy options for increased
eﬃciency and price stabilization. World Bank Africa Region Working Paper Series, No. 101, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Minten, B., Randrianarisoa, J.C. and Randrianarison, L. (2003) Agriculture, Pauvrete´ Rurale et Politiques
E ´conomiques a` Madagascar (Antananarivo: Cornell University/FOFIFA/INSTAT).
Moizot, B. (1997) Des Esprits, des Tombeaux, du Miel et des Bœufs: Perception et Utilisation de la Fore ˆ t
en Pays Bara Imamono. Milieux et Socie ´ te ´ s dans le Sud-Ouest de Madagascar, Collecion Iles et
Archipels no 23, Madagascar.
Moser, C. and Barrett, C. (2003) The disappointing adoption dynamics of a yield-increasing, low external
input technology: the case of SRI in Madagascar. Agricultural Systems, 76(3), pp. 1085–1100.
North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge
University Press).
Osei, J. (2006) The value of African taboos for biodiversity and sustainable development. Journal of
Sustainable Development in Africa, 8(3), pp. 42–61.
Ottino, P. (1986) L’E ´trange`re Intime: Essaie d’Anthropologie de la Civilisation de l’Ancien Madagascar
(Editions des Archives Contemporaines).
Platteau, J. (1994) Behind the market stage where real societies exist – part II: the role of moral norms.
Journal of Development Studies, 30(3), pp. 753–817.
Proﬁta, P. (1978) La Societe ´ Malgache et ses Valeurs Ancestrales. Photocopy Eveche d’Ambatondrazaka.
Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Institutions in Modern
Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Raison-Jourde, F. (1991) Bible et pouvoir a` Madagascar au XIXe sie`cle: Invention d’une identite´ chre´tienne
et construction de l’E ´tat (1780–1880) (Paris: Karthala Press).
Rakotomahefa, P., Razakamanantsoa, M. and Romani, M. (2002) Madagascar poverty proﬁle 2001:
technical report. Photocopy INSTAT, Antananarivo, Madagascar.
Ramamonjisoa, J. (2002) Les Relations entre Ethnies a ` Madagascar: Une Proble ´ matique Souvent Mal
Pose ´ e. Afrique Contemporaine, Trimestriel no. 202–203.
Razaﬁndravonona, J., Stifel, D. and Paternostro, S. (2001) Changes in poverty in Madagascar: 1993–1999.
Africa Region Working Paper Series, No. 19, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Rohlfs, C., Reed, A. and Yamado, H. (2010) Causal eﬀects of sex preference on sex-blind and sex-selective
child avoidance and substitution across birth years: evidence from the Japanese Year of the Fire
Horse. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), pp. 82–95.
Ruud, J. (1960) Taboo: A Study of Malagasy Customs and Beliefs (Oslo: Oslo University Press).
Shatenstein, B. and Ghadirian, P. (1998) Inﬂuence of diet, health behavior and their outcome in select
ethnocultural and religious groups. Nutrition, 14(2), pp. 223–230.
Solondraibe, T. (1988) Croyances Religieuses et Populaires Traditionelles et Agriculture: Le Cas des ‘tany
fady’ et ‘andro fady’ dans le Betsileo. Recherche pour le De´veloppement, 5(1), pp. 35–62.
Stifel, D. and Minten, B. (2008) Isolation and agricultural productivity. Agricultural Economics, 39(1), pp.
1–115.
Thaler, R. (1987a) Seasonal movements in security prices II: weekend, holiday, turn of the month and
intraday eﬀects. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(2), pp. 169–177.




































































 Thaler, R. (1987b) The January eﬀect. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(1), pp. 197–201.
Van Gennep, A. (1904) Tabou et tote´misme a` Madagascar (Paris: Ernest Leroux).
Van de Walle, D. and Gunewardena, D. (2001) Sources of ethnic inequality. Journal of Development
Economics, 65(1), pp. 177–207.
Verin, P. (1990) Madagascar (Paris: Editions Karthala).
Wong, K. and Yung, L. (2005) Do dragons have better fate. Economic Inquiry, 43(3), pp. 689–697.
Woolcock, M. (1998) Social capital and economic development: toward a theoretical synthesis and policy
framework. Theory and Society, 27, pp. 151–208.
Wright, H. and Rakotoarisoa, J.A. (2003) The rise of Malagasy societies: new developments in the
archaeology of Madagascar, in: S. Goodman and J. Benstead (eds) The Natural History of
Madagascar (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).
Zak, P.J. and Knack, S. (2001) Trust and growth. The Economic Journal, 111(470), pp. 295–321.
Zakia, A.S. and Anwar, J.Z. (1993) Muslim Women: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: MD
Publications).
Appendix: Descriptive statistics
Table A1 shows some of the basic socio-economic descriptive statistics of the
households that we study. The age of the average household is 43 years. Eighteen per
cent of the households are headed by females and the size of the household is ﬁve
members. Education levels are low as 29 per cent of the heads of households did not
receive any education. About 17 per cent of household heads went on to pursue
secondary or higher education. The survey allowed for 22 ethnic groups, the most
important of which are the Betsileo and Merina, mostly resident in the highlands,
and the Betsimisaraka located mostly on the east coast. Together, they account for
55 per cent of our sample.
Poverty is high by any measure. The head-count ratio of poverty (P0) is estimated
to be 77.6 per cent of individuals in our sample, which is comparable to estimates
from other national household surveys that have been held in the last decade. The
depth of poverty (P1) is estimated at 28 per cent. The average annual per capita
expenditures are estimated at almost 1 million Fmg in 2001 currency (about $150
annually or $0.41 per day). This high objective poverty measurement is consistent
with subjective measures in the data. About 54 per cent of the households state that
they have diﬃculties while 29 per cent state that they must to pay attention.
32
Agriculture is a main source of income for households in Madagascar. Further,
rice is the primary staple crop, accounting for almost 50 per cent of all calorie
consumption in the country (Faostat, 2000). The data used in this analysis include
detailed information about agricultural inputs and production, providing us with
important information about people’s livelihoods. As illustrated in Table A2, just
over 37 per cent of the reported plots in the sample were lowland plots where mostly
only rice is grown. The average plot size is small: the mean is 38 ares and the median
is 12 ares. To facilitate comparison over plots, we focus only on rice crops in this
article. Physical characteristics of rice plots are reported in Table A2. The low rice
yields seen in Table 1 are often due to the low adoption of improved agricultural
technologies. It is estimated that only 16 per cent of the rice plots receive some type
of modern inputs (deﬁned as chemical fertiliser, pesticides or herbicides). Manure
and compost was used on 31 per cent of the plots.




































































 Table A1. Descriptive statistics for agricultural households
Variable unit total Standard deviation
Household migrated within past 5 years % of hh 2.80
Female-headed household % of hh 11.9
Age head of household mean 43.8 12.7
Household size
Number of adult equivalents mean 5.5 2.3
Number of adult equivalents per are of land mean 0.66 1.26
HH member w/ at least secondary education % of hh 25.4
Ethnic group of household head
Antakarana % of hh 1
Antambahoaka % of hh 51
Antandroy % of hh 8
Antanosy % of hh 2
Antefasy % of hh 51
Antemoro % of hh 4
Antesaka % of hh 4
Bara % of hh 2
Betsileo % of hh 16
Betsimisaraka % of hh 13
Bezanozano % of hh 51
Comoriana % of hh 51
Mahafaly % of hh 3
Merina % of hh 26
Sakalava % of hh 5
Sihanaka % of hh 3
Sinoa % of hh 51
Tanala % of hh 3
Tsimihety % of hh 8
Vezo % of hh 51
Other ethnic group % of hh 1
Religion of household head
Traditional % of hh 19.2
Catholic % of hh 35.0
Anglican % of hh 1.9
Protestant % of hh 19.7
Lutheran % of hh 11.5
Other religion % of hh 12.8
Number of observations 3443




































































 Table A2. Descriptive statistics at the rice plot level
Variable unit total Standard deviation
Family labour used on plot % of plots 73.0
Plot ownership
Owned by HH % of plots 92.3
Sharecropped % of plots 2.0
Rented or gifted % of plots 5.8
Physical characteristics
Plot size (hectares) mean 0.52 1.73
median 0.25
Topographic situation
Riceﬁelds lowland % of plots 62.1
Riceﬁelds at bottom of hill % of plots 19.2
Riceﬁelds in terras % of plots 8.2
Upland at bottom of hill % of plots 3.5
Upland middle of the hill % of plots 5.1
Upland top of the hill % of plots 1.9
Soil type
Sand % of plots 11.1
Clay % of plots 52.6
Mud % of plots 22.0
Other % of plots 10.0
Do not know % of plots 4.2
Slope
Very ﬂat % of plots 59.6
Flat % of plots 27.5
Sloped % of plots 10.5
Very sloped % of plots 2.4
Number of observations 3418
Taboos, Agriculture and Poverty 1481
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